Feb. - May 1864
Union Batteries
Stafford Country, VA
The dates are a bit vague, but all of these sites can be found inside the fabulous Stafford Civil War Park, which also covers the Army of the Potomac's winter quarters after Fredericksburg (for 11th Corps, 1st and 3rd Divisions)and the Mud March in 1863.
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| https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=65213 |
On 15 Feb 1863 Major-General Joseph Hooker directed that the road passing about one mile to the west of Brooke's Station and leading to Stafford Court House be put in condition to be practicable for artillery at all times, corduroying it where necessary with material of sufficient length to form a double-track roadway. A large segment of that road built by Union 11th Corps soldiers and engineers can be seen behind this sign. Nearly 150 years later, the VA Army National Guard's 276th Engineer Battalion and VA Air National Guard's 203rd Red Horse Squadron built and paved this park's roads.
At the right is the order for a dual-track corduroy road, remains of which can still be seen just beyond this sign. Below are details for construction of corduroy roads as reported earlier in the war by a Union staff officer. Corduroy roads were needed in swampy areas or loamy soils such as Stafford’s, to allow for the timely movement of troops, artillery, ammunition and supplies as necessary to support either offensive or defensive operations.
“As to the nature of the construction, that will depend upon circumstances. Where the soil is sandy, a good road can always be easily made if we only throw up the roadway a foot or 18 inches above the natural surface and pay proper attention to the drainage. …Where the soil is swampy and the roadway would have to he raised above the water, we would resort to corduroying, but this, in order that it may stand the travel of a large army, should be carefully put down and always be supported on longitudinal stringers. A corduroy road, if carefully built is a very good military road, particularly if the logs be covered with about 6 inches of brush, and then with about 6 inches of almost any kind of earth over the brush. In a wooded country, with a large force, it can be made very rapidly… As to the time required to make the proposed road, I am of the opinion judging from my experience in making roads with soldiers since the war commenced that we may safely say the each man can make 15 inches of road per day.”
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| https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=70400 |
"Eleventh Corps artillery units in 1863 were equipped with 3-inch ordnance rifles and 4.62-inch model 1857 Napoleon cannon often referred to as 12-pounders. Ordnance rifles could fire a solid or hollow 3-inch, iron, buLlet-shaped projectile nearly 2,800 yards. Explosive shells contained iron or lead shot around a black powder explosive charge. The Napoleon guns also fired both solid and explosive cannonballs. Both types of guns could fire canister shot, iron balls inside a tin container propelled by an iron plate between the powder and the shot. Canister, once fired, spread out rapidly and was very lethal out to 400 yards against massed infantry. If Napoleon guns were “double- shotted” (a second round stripped of its powder bag and placed on top of the first one) 96 iron balls over 1-inch in diameter could be fired at one lime. Artillery placement in this area would have been driven by terrain, visibility, gun range and the threat. Battery #2, with its exceptional visibility and range in three directions, likely utilized ordnance rifles. Battery #1 covered the Potomac Church road and Daniel Bridge, both potential avenues of enemy attack. Battery #3 with its more open, less steep terrain, may have utilized 12-pounders which had shorter range and were more lethal in close combat. Several 11th Corps soldier letters and diaries describe the construction of the batteries or fortifications in and around this park to include deployed artillery. Unfortunately, documents found to date do not detail the specific units or type of artillery in each of the fortifications preserved in this park. Research is continuing.
11th Corps Artillery Brigade Units:
1st New York Artillery, Battery I
2nd New York Battery
13th New York Battery
1st Ohio Artillery, Battery I
1st Ohio Artillery, Battery K
Source: Organization of the Army of the Potomac, May 31, 1863. OR Series 1, Part II, Vol 25, #40.
(captions)
11th Corps Ordnance
(1) 3-inch Hotchkiss shell (explosive)
(2) 12lb cannonball (case Shot)
(3) 12lb cannonball (solid shot)
(4) 10lb Parrot (explosive)
(5) 3-inch Schenkl (shell)
(6) Canister shot – 12lb Napoleon"
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| Visiting in February for the full effect. |
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| https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=65217 |
"At 200 feet above sea level, this is the highest of the three batteries in this park. Its three-faced parapet allowed it to support other nearby batteries and encampments against attacks from multiple directions. Its very steep approaches would have been cleared of trees in 1863 and, combined with its well-preserved 182' of parapet and ditches, would have proved exceedingly difficult to attack from the Accokeek Valley. It is estimated to have held from four to five guns."
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| https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=65199 |
"The largest and strongest battery in this park; this one contains nearly 300 linear feet of parapet 30 feet thick. The foundation of a large blockhouse also remains. The battery could have supported all three nearby batteries. Its blockhouse also protected the double-track army corduroy road, remains of which can be seen to its rear. The battery contains evidence of multiple gun embrasures and interior structures. its thick walls and large blockhouse indicate possible use of heavy caliber rifled guns from the artillery reserve."
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| https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=70404 |
A large number of the soldiers who camped in and built the roads and fortifications preserved in this park were German-Americans. Most studies of ethnicity in the Civil War have focused on Irish or African-American soldiers, yet German-Americans were the largest ethnic group in federal service, enlisting in numbers beyond their proportion to the overall population. In the Army of the Potomac, these immigrant soldiers outnumbered those of Irish descent two to one. Most came from New York and Pennsylvania; smaller numbers from Ohio, Illinois, Missouri and Wisconsin. Many participated in the early western battles of Wilson’s Creek, Carthage and Pea Ridge, where General Franz Sigel, who later briefly commanded in this area, was hailed as a hero. In the east, General Ludwig Blenker and his “German Division” were lauded for covering the Union retreat from 1st Manassas. The public’s perception of German-American soldiers, however, changed drastically after the Battle of Chancellorsville. There the 11th Corps, which contained a majority of German-speaking soldiers, under Major General Oliver Otis Howard, a West Point graduate from Maine, was flanked and decisively defeated by Stonewall Jackson’s veteran Confederate infantrymen.
After Chancellorsville, German-American soldiers became the scapegoats of the failed campaign even though numerous Eleventh Corps soldiers had tried to warn Union Generals Hooker, Howard, and Devens that Confederates were massing on their flank. Captain Hubert Dilger of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery I, was told at Hooker’s headquarters to “tell his yarn at Eleventh Corps headquarters,” where he was also dismissed. Dejected, he returned to his battery and prepared it for action. Dr. Christian Keller of the U.S. Army War College, in a recently published book titled Chancellorsville and the Germans, stated that, “It is not an exaggeration to say the North’s German-born population net got over what happened in the Virginia woods in May of 1863.” In those woods, approximately 8,800 poorly deployed 11th Corps soldiers were attacked on their right and rear by 26,000 Confederate soldiers. In the aftermath of the Chancellorsville campaign, no single man would be blamed for the battle; instead the blame fell on an entire corps, and, by proxy, German-Americans. Many years later, Major General Darius Couch, a West Pointer and former Commander of the Army of the Potomac’s Second Corps at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, wrote about the flank attack. In his summary, he noted that, “It can be emphatically stated that no Corps in the army, surprised as the Eleventh Corps was at this time, could have held its ground under similar circumstances.” Thirty years after the baffle, Captain Hubert Dilger received the Medal of Honor for his actions at Chancellorsville.
“Exclusively German” 11th Corps Regiments
(21 May, 1863)
82nd Illinois
29th New York
41st New York
45th New York
54th New York
58th New York
68th New York
27th Pennsylvania
74th Pennsylvania
75th Pennsylvania
26th Wisconsin
Mixed Nationality 11th Corps Regiments
(21 May, 1863)
119th New York
107th Ohio
73rd Pennsylvania
153rd Pennsylvania
Source: OR, Series I, Vol 25, #39
(captions)
41st New York Infantry
82nd Illinois Infantry
Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.
Commander, 1st Division, XI Corps
Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.
Commander, 1st Division, XI Corps
Brig. Gen. Adolf von Steinwehr
Commander, 2nd Division, XI Corps
Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz
Commander, 3rd Division, XI Corps
Captain Hubert Dilger
1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery I"
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| https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=70399 |
"By late May 1863 Major-General Joseph Hooker, likely concerned over a possible attack to cut off or capture his supply depot at Aquia Landing, adjusted his lines. Four additional batteries were built in the 11th Corps area south of the Accokeek. This battery had two gun-shelves for artillery, 216 linear feet of parapet, a 56’ long zig-zag trench and they blockhouse. The fortification with ideally positioned to repel a Confederate force should it attack the 11th Corps via the Potomac Church Road or bridge to the north."
* See Also Winter of '63
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